smoking and interesting hairdos about which Flew wanes nostalgic, a more apt scene to open the book comes at the end of season five of Mad Men. Don Draper, sensing a changing world, puts on, begins to listen to, then abruptly takes off, the Beatles' Tomorrow Never Knows. Don is happy to shift product but he's not buying into the counter--cultural dream. Indeed, as the rest of the book's introduction makes clear, it is the economic impact of this explosion of commercial creative culture that is crucial, and certainly not that branch of cultural studies which claimed to articulate the sixties' revolutionary promise. The counter--culture did not sell out, it was always working in the creative industries.
Though the term 'creative industries' is now widely used, its agenda has lacked a book length exposition. John Hartley's Creative Industries (2005) is an edited collection prefaced by a eulogy to the rise and rise of the citizen--consumer, followed by many chapters directly contradicting or at least confusing this message. Stuart
Cunningham's work circulates on the margins between academic and 'grey' policy literature. Terry Flew, publishing across the fields of media, cultural studies and cultural geography, seems ideal for the task of outlining the dynamics, possibilities and challenges facing the creative industries in the next decade. This is not the book we get. Unlike in David Hesmondhalgh's The Cultural Industries, there are no detailed accounts of the workings of creative industries and their various sub--sectors, nor any case studies or sustained conceptual or historical accounts of the complex social changes underpinning the creative industries. What we get, from introduction to conclusion, is a series of running battles between the author and all those, mostly in cultural studies, who are critical of the creative industries. The result is a rather airless book, one no policy--maker would read (who cares what a bunch of cultural lefties say?) and of which students will struggle to make sense. It's rather like a parliamentary debate, lots of ding--dong arguments but very difficult to follow if you are not already immersed in the context. 1 The book's textbook mode-giving 'an empirical account of the key concepts related to the creative industries' (2)-sits awkwardly with its proselytising second aim-an 'historical account of the creative industries as a discursive concept'. (2) If the first aim concerns a set of activities with various social, cultural and economic conditions and outcomes, the second concerns a policy and academic agenda which makes (positive) normative claims about them. In textbook mode the book VOLUME18 NUMBER3 DEC2012 390 summarises well--known academic and policy work about the peculiarities of cultural or creative products-their riskiness, their use of flexible creative labour, the marketing and management strategies used to overcome this and so on. But this is distorted by the constant need to defend the normative claims of the creative industries agenda; not just to describe them but to describe them as a good thing.
The world--changing scenario of mid--1960s Manhattan immediately shifts three decades later to Britain's New Labour, whose invention of the term 'creative industries' somehow set the seal on these global transformations. Flew claims that creative industries: 'is somewhat unusual as a concept in social and cultural theory as it has its origins in policy discourse'. (2) This is rather tendentious. Many designations originating within policy make their way as objects of investigation into social and cultural theory-'social exclusion', 'consumer choice', 'privatisation' or 'classless society' for example. These have proliferated further since the rise of policy think tanks over the last thirty years or so. Some are passing fads, some have more traction. Whether they become robust concepts depends on how they survive the rigorous testing of thought and debate. The creative industries began not as a concept but as a tactical political manoeuvre by the UK's Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to secure more funding for culture from the Treasury. The replacement of 'cultural' by 'creative' may be symptomatic of more profound economic and cultural shifts-something this book quite legitimately argues forbut it was never meant to carry the freight of a full--blown theoretical concept. It was in academic writing associated with Terry Flew and his colleagues at the Centre for Creative Industries and Innovation at Queensland University of Technology (CCI) that it was fleshed out as a sociocultural concept. It is significant that this is never mentioned in the book.
Chapter one outlines New Labour's introduction of the term 'creative industries' within policy discourse. A brief summary of Foucault's 'classic account of discourse analysis' (Foucault is a regular if contentious visitor to this book) and a 'lit. review' paragraph on policy studies are passed over without examination. This is a shame because it skips a key aspect of Foucauldian discourse analysis and of the cultural policy studies school of which Flew is part. 'Governmentality' is the power to name and classify and to assemble people and things around a particular project of government. If creative industries subsequently became a concept, then it did so in order to take advantage of this on--going policy project. The objections to creative industries were two--fold. First, that it was incoherent as a concept. Briefly, 'creativity' was far too vague to characterise this particular industry-were not science, health, financial services creative?-and it consequently failed to identify the specificity of the object (its cultural element) thus undermining its effectiveness as policy. Second, that as a cultural and economic strategy for the United Kingdom's future it was either misplaced (it could never deliver on its economic promises) or undesirable (it reduced culture to economics). It was perfectly possible to take the first position and not the second; indeed, those arguing for the 'cultural industries' did this, as did many academics and consultants, who wanted to take (what they considered) an incoherent term and make it adequately describe this sector. This possibility is not considered in the book and there is a clear reason why not.
The 'open secret' (as Slavoj Zizek would say) for most academics reading this book is that in picking up the term 'creative industries' CCI were not just fleshing out a policy term into a full--blown concept, they were developing a brand used to promote a re--vamped arts faculty and a newly constructed 'creative campus'. This brand did not just rely on the growth in size and profile of the creative industry sector-new careers, new skills, new research opportunities-but on the profile of the policy term. There was nothing new about New Labour's identification of the increased economic importance of culture or the tendencies to convergence brought about by digitalisation-these were already well rehearsed in the cultural industries literature of the 1980s and 1990s. What was important was the brand value of the term 'creative industries' when embraced by a high profile government and successfully (if unexpectedly) exported around the globe. The need to retain the brand meant the two objections-its conceptual confusion and its political undesirability or unfeasibility-must be rolled together and rejected as one.
Objections to the 'creative industries' as a concept have to be characterised as objections to the creative industries as a sector. So when Flew worries about the current UK government turning away from creative industries and warns of 'Wimbledonisation'-'where Britain retains a strong symbolic association with the field, even where most of the ownership and action has moved elsewhere' (31)-he is not (presumably) expecting one of the world's most influential sectors to up sticks and move to Asia. He is worried that the brand might move elsewhere. If it is VOLUME18 NUMBER3 DEC2012 392 abandoned or marginalised in its policy homeland, the problem cannot lie with the concept but with that declining polity which has missed the wave of the future.
These two moments, the explosion of commercial popular culture and its eventual recognition at the level of policy, frame the book. They also provide the structural binary that divides the field between creative industry supporters and its critics in cultural studies and the critical humanities (economists just get on with it).
The critics are engaged in a normative attack on the creative industries as a 'Trojan The notion that one can both embrace and be critical of popular culture, just as one can be critically opposed to a particular policy practice and its impacts (such as the creative industries agenda) and seek to change it to a different one, is simply not possible according to Flew's mutually exclusive binary system. If, for example, one were to acknowledge the transformative power of popular culture and suggest that its reduction to a narrowly economic agenda is not desirable, then the creative industries brand would be in serious jeopardy, and so such a position is disallowed.
In The Guardian recently Jarvis Cocker of Pulp wrote of the Beatles:
Four working--class boys from Liverpool who showed that not only could they create art that stood comparison with that produced by 'the establishment'-they could create art that pissed all over it. From the ranks of the supposedly uncouth, unwashed barbarians came the greatest creative force of the 20th century. It wasn't meant to be that way. It wasn't officially sanctioned. But it happened-and that gave countless others from similar backgrounds the nerve to try it themselves. Their effect on music and society at large is incalculable. 2 The incalculable effect cannot be reduced to the profit Don Draper might recoup. Its economic effects are enormous, so much is clear, but they are also ambiguous, double edged. The same can be said of their social and cultural impacts. The creative industries agenda, as outlined in this book, simply cannot produce such a nuanced understanding of the dynamics and effects of the rise of popular culture, nor of finding ways to intervene in this growing sector for a range of economic, cultural and social purposes. Instead, it consists in accepting every development in commercial popular culture as completely legitimate and desirable and every government policy to support this as something to be welcomed without reserve and facilitated as best we can. This constant labelling of all critical thinking as 'revolutionary romanticism' or (more prosaically) 'Marxist' corresponds to the violence inherent in the governmental ability to designate and assemble people and things in policy discourse, and delegitimise those outside this designation. It is a form of conceptual violence dedicated to the protection of a brand, which will refute the critics by any means necessary.
This conceptual violence can be found in the argumentative tropes used by Flew. There is the use of lists or thematic headings to summarise different strands of thought, as in a textbook. They give the cumulative impression of a body of evidence in favour of the creative industries but on closer inspection are often highly contentious, tangential or directly opposed to the overall thesis. In the chapter on public policy where we might expect a sustained analysis of the emergence of the creative industries we get a list of ten factors that when added up are supposed to make creative industries (for the doubters the last section is a critique of those who would call this neoliberalism). In chapter three the intellectual antecedents of the creative industries concept are itemised. From the Frankfurt School and its critics we move to 'political economy', then to 'cultural studies', then 'cultural economic geography', 'cultural and institutional economics' and, finally, 'production of culture/cultural economy'. These headings may just work in a textbook overview of different approaches to culture and economy but here their arguments are all lined VOLUME18 NUMBER3 DEC2012 394 up as milestones on the road to the creative industries moment. We are presented with a series of ill--digested summaries whose consequences for the overall thesis are not examined: what is important for Flew is that they somehow discuss culture and economy together and therefore must legitimate the creative industries agenda.
A second trope is using authors who are otherwise critical (or who could be assumed to be critical) of the creative industries agenda to make the argument in its favour. Thus the Frankfurt School is taken to task for failing to understand the Hesmondhalgh's telling critique of the proposed alliance between those in precarious labour-the Filipino cleaning woman and the harassed new media worker-is used to reject the wider critique of the degradation of labour conditions in the creative industries, even though Hesmondhalgh has published extensively arguing this very point. 3 A third trope Flew uses is the 'neutral' textbook form, to lay out literature critical of the creative industries without addressing its specific points, and then present more favourable literature as if this were a corrective to the former. This is made worse when crucial evidence in favour of the creative industries is drawn from Flew's CCI colleagues without this being acknowledged. Combined, these tropes make for a disconcerting book, with its arguments morphing like an Escher drawing. instead used to justify a thesis-the rise of the creative suburbs-for which they were never intended, but this is, as we have seen, a key trope in the book. The rapid morph from the relational advantage of cities for creative industries to a deflection of the gentrification critique onto the 'hipster' eulogised on the very first page of the VOLUME18 NUMBER3 DEC2012 396 book is simply driven by the fear that Flew might be inadvertently favouring metropolitan arts and culture over the everyday creativity of the suburbs.
The division between those for and against popular culture informs an assumption that arts policies are intrinsically elitist and that all attempts to assert cultural value within the economics of the creative industries-as the cultural industries approach did-is a surreptitious arts policy. Garnham, for example, is used as a critic of traditional cultural policy-that subsidies to protect art from the market can only be reactive and ineffectual. But this was part of his argument for an intervention within the economy, using economic tools, to secure cultural policy outcomes from that intervention. This cultural industries agenda is nowhere discussed, other than as a stepping--stone to that of the full recognition of the creative industries agenda.
This fear of culture pervades the highly technical discussion on defining the creative industries (one for the enthusiasts this chapter). The problem with the DCMS list is that it is just a list-how do all these activities hang together? Two solutions emerge. The first, taken by Will Hutton (and the European Union), consists of trying to identify a specifically cultural sector and a wider creative sector. This model derives from David Throsby (an economist, a group otherwise held not to concern themselves with such niceties) whose concentric circle model has core arts at the centre followed by cultural industries and creative industries. The problem with these models is that a set of activities associated with the traditional arts is held both to involve a purer creativity and provide the original input into the value chain. Flew, and many others (including myself) disagree with this. However, Hutton's intent (like the somewhat fudged European Union version) was to identify products that were primarily cultural ('expressive value') and those that included cultural/expressive inputs but also had material--functional elements. There are lots of problems with this account, but it is an attempt to get over the problem that 'creative' is far too broad a concept and that policy might need to identify a more specific sector whose primary product is 'cultural'. Other priorities (such as urban regeneration) might emphasise museums or art or live music. That is, the model did not flatten all to a list but allowed intelligent policy choices to be made across a range of priorities based on different economic VOLUME18 NUMBER3 DEC2012 398 dynamics. Flew sees it as simply a taxonomy to direct economic investment; for Flew having a cultural and an economic policy is simply not thinkable. This is not to say that Flew has no cultural policy, it is just that is not made explicit:
The DCMS Mapping Documents were described as 'nothing less than a new manifesto for cultural studies' (Hartley, 2003:118) 7 Three developments flowed from this. First, governmentality was now not conceived as ideology but as actively constructing the reality to which its actions were directed (a finding developed further in cultural economy literature). Therefore it had a much greater scope for autonomous action than the Marxists would allow. Second, that this expanded field of governmentality included that very culture which claimed autonomy from economy and state. This cast the emancipatory promise of culture-transposed by cultural studies to 'the popular'-in some doubt. The creation of the cultured self was a key site on which the modern state had built its foundations. This being the case, third, cultural politics had to be played out within the parameters set by the state rather than claim some transcendent critical purchase. Tony Bennett, writing of cultural policy in 1992 suggested:
Intellectual work [should] be conducted in a manner such that, in both its substance and its style, it can be calculated to influence or service the conduct of identifiable agents with the region of culture concerned. 8 Tony Bennett's call in that same piece to learn to 'talk to the ISAs' (ideological state apparatus) can be understood in a certain context in which radical critique went hand in hand with its own marginalisation. Indeed, becoming a 'situated intellectual' is now perhaps part of the modern academic persona. Even if we accept this assessment, two points need to be made. First, the recognition of limits does not necessarily mean an abandonment of critical thought; Foucault might not promise emancipation in the classic Marxist sense, but he was always clear--eyed about power. Second, between 'influence' and 'service' lies a whole range of choices, from crusading activist, through annoying gadfly, to full--on functionary. A growing tendency within cultural policy studies was that to influence or to serve one had to drop the critical thought, which is mostly equated with 'Marxist'. Flew's book clearly bears the marks of this pragmatic turn-setting out to provide governments with the policy instruments to promote the economic growth of the creative industries and bemoaning the infantile antics of those who hold to out--dated critique. But there was a problem-did not cultural policy studies imply that all we could do was choose between different govermentalities? Without its emancipatory charge, did not cultural policy become mere administration? John Hartley's work broke this impasse. Hartley agreed that art and culture were about governmentality; they were elitist and used to dominate the lower classes. That was not the whole story. Effectively overturning Bennett's proposition about governmentality, Hartley (notably in his 1999 introduction to Uses of Television) argued for the progressive self--education of the masses, the citizen--consumers, through their own self--generated popular culture. 9 The explosion of commercial culture from the 1920s and the spread of the internet were the end points of this emancipatory process. We can now see how the two themes that frame Flew's book-the democratic promise of commercial popular culture and the need to service the interests of policy-culminate in a stark dichotomy between governmentality for art and culture (elitist, dominating, yet for all that characterised by 'market failure') and emancipation through popular culture. It is equally clear that the charge that creative industries reduces culture to economics therefore misses the point: the market is the privileged carrier of popular culture and thus any attempt to assert some cultural element which might temper the economic can only be an elitist attempt to reinscribe the hierarchical value of 'art'. The pursuit of the economic agenda for the creative industries is at the same time a pursuit of the democratic popular culture agenda.
What stands in the way of this agenda? Obviously, the critical humanities and other revolutionary romantics, but once these have been dispatched to the dustbin of history there are three final issues that close the book. Equally, the idea that the internet is going to achieve this democratisation of production-consumption of its own accord bears no scrutiny in an age of Amazon, Apple, Google and Facebook. In effect we are left with a utopian fantasy in which, once the distributional bottleneck is broken apart by the internet, there will be the ecstatic creative communication of everybody with everybody, all consuming and producing interchangeably.
Flew's third challenge is to declare that we must move from a creative economy to a creative society. It is highly appropriate that the two themes of the book should come together on the final page of the book. They converge in the figure of Li Wu Wei, a party bureaucrat--academic from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, who calls for the universalisation of creative industries. Li Wu Wei's book is a fairly banal manifesto for creativity commissioned by the national government in Beijing, which is translated by another CCI colleague. 10 Li Wu Wei's call for universal creativity prompts Flew to ask if we should not be thinking about a future creative society. The logical consequence, for Flew, is that the creative industries should move from a niche position to become central to '21st century culture and policy'. While Flew appears oblivious to these historical echoes, they take us back to the question of modernity and its deepening or second acceleration since the 1960s.
Culture has changed and has become intertwined with the economic in ways we are still figuring out. What is clear is, like the rest of modernity, it brings both opportunity and danger. What these might be and how we might face them are crucial, open questions. We have gone beyond the moment of cultural policy studies, which is in danger of being stuck in a sterile opposition of pragmatics or (impossible, totalitarian) revolution, and consequently trapped by its refusal of any function for culture other than unwitting governmental compliance and determination. While this has produced some lucid puncturing of the self--delusions of cultural reformers and radicals alike, it has also produced pragmatic accommodations with the agendas set by government indistinguishable from the most servile functionaries of authoritarian states-except that the latter mostly do it under duress. What is striking about the cultural policy studies' agenda is the thinness of its achievements-it talks real world, commercialisation and industry, but has little to show in these areas; cultural think tanks, consultancies and activists have been more rewarded for their willingness to ask radical questions. The obedient dog of policy studies has delivered the body of a once fearsome cultural studies to the feet of its master, who has politely and gingerly picked it up and put it on one side.
We need the moment of critique, of the negation, in order to engage with the present. This will include working with (what can no longer be called in polite company) the ISAs; but it will also include opposing them. 'Culture' as a sphere of (relative) autonomy and its promise of emancipation and fulfilment rapidly became characterised as a site for discipline and biopolitics. But it was never just that, as the late Foucault began to make clear. Its emancipatory promise remains elusive, but it remains nonetheless. It need be said that this was something John Hartley was correct to assert, but for him that promise could only be through commercial popular culture, the rest is elitist noise. Cultural policy inevitably has to work with government, as Adorno recognised in 'Culture and Administration', but its task is not simply to extend the remit of the powers that be or indeed to be reduced to the promotion of its economic dimension. 11 Cultural policy is more than a technology of economic growth; it must also mean care for culture, as the site of a self and a social formation in which a certain access to truth and meaning is made possible. This is surely what Raymond Williams meant by the idea of culture, and it also emerges in the late Foucault. 12 Caring for culture means making a judgement; the grounds of that judgement are inevitably contestable and contested, but they have to include the economic conditions which make that culture possible, which may also threaten to make it thinner, poorer, subservient.
There are rapid transformations in progress as cultures and economies morph and fold with digital communications and globalisation. Making the case for cultural values not against but within these processes is a complex and difficult take, and it does no service simply to promote 'economic growth' and dismiss the rest as arts elitism. In his arguments against neoliberalism, Flew tells us there are many forms of capitalism; accordingly, it seems perfectly reasonable not to want the neoliberal version and not thereby be classed a romantic revolutionary. Indeed, the treatment of economics in Flew's book is mostly superficial. It includes statements such as 'Human societies have always engaged in consumption' (110) or 'the study of markets is characteristically the domain of economics', (115) which are either banal or meaningless in a book dealing with the changing relations of culture and economics. What cultural economy has taught us is that these are highly historically specific and constructed entities. This does not mean they can be reconstructed at will; it does mean that understanding the specifics of, say, a market transaction, involving all manner of market 'devices' and subjectivities, needs to be undertaken in a critical, clear--eyed manner not assumed as an eternal and inevitable social reality to which critical theorists must bow down.
If the creative industries agenda is really to get to grips with the complexities and contradictions of the contemporary cultural economy then it needs to start thinking again, not just-as this book does-devote its attention to demolishing its critics. CCI's celebratory brand of 'creative industries' fails to engage productively VOLUME18 NUMBER3 DEC2012 408 with the multiple and various critiques that have been thrown up against it, merely dismissing opponents as 'Marxists'. Defending creative industries by disavowing the legitimacy of critical thought is now surely dysfunctional. Without the moment of critique, Flew's model of creative industries (and that of CCI with which it forms part) becomes one dimensional and limited. Everything it espouses is necessarily good and wholly good at that (the internet, mobile phone apps, teen pop music, reality television, porn) and, conversely, everything that does not fit its model of the good is bad and irredeemable, such as 'high culture,' which is malign, elitist, anti--democratic and, worst of all, not sufficiently commercial. This CCI model requires the high--low cultural divide, even as it dismisses it. Once established in its dichotomy, we know that everything good is completely good and the rest is redundant, backward and not part of the future. This is the guiding theme not only throughout Flew's book, but throughout all of the CCI discourse and its treatment of favoured items of study and scrutiny. It is ideological in the older sense of the word; it lines people up on each side of a creative-commercial divide, where we immediately know which side is correct-the side of the future! Critique certainly needs to work with the materiality of the 'real', not just set up a transcendental ideal to which the real must aspire. But those who would stress 'reality' must also acknowledge the highly constructed nature of that 'real' to which thinking and writing contribute. Equally, critique must challenge the exclusive right of power to set the terms on which that real is engaged. Recently, a UK government minister responded to someone who said a university without philosophy is not a university with the words: 'then we will call it something else'. 13 It recalls Bruno Latour's quote from Ron Suskind's encounter with a US aide: 'That's not the way the world really works anymore,' he continued. 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality-judiciously, as you will-we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors ... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do. ' 14 Critique is not the posturing of a radical persona who knows the truth behind the ideological veil, as Latour tellingly argues. 15 Access to that truth demands real thinking, of the kind that challenges the self as well as the object. In The Uses of
